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LITTLE: REASSESSING THE PROBATIVE VALUE
OF SILENCE

Mikah K. Story Thompson*

I. INTRODUCTION
1

The syllogism goes as follows: major premise - Innocent people proclaim
their innocence in response to an accusation; minor premise - Defendant failed
to respond to an officer's accusation that he killed his wife; conclusion Defendant is guilty of killing his wife. This syllogism is the basis upon which
courts and lawmakers allow a defendant's silence to be admitted into evidence
as proof of guilt. They reason that it is quite appropriate forjurors to infer that
a defendant's
innocent people would proclaim their innocence and, therefore,
2
decision not to speak constitutes evidence of his or her guilt.
This Article will challenge the assumptions upon which the syllogism rests.
It will ultimately demonstrate that the major premise, which argues that the
innocent speak while the guilty remain silent, is often untrue, especially when
the person leveling the accusation is a member of law enforcement. Research
in the areas of sociology, psychology, and communications reveals that a
person's silence in relation to law enforcement officers can reflect many things
other than guilt or innocence. Part II of this Article will discuss the traditional
evidentiary uses of silence. Part III will discuss the manner in which the Fifth
Amendment privilege and the reading of Miranda warnings affect the
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1 The American Heritage Dictionary defines a syllogism as "[a] form of deductive
reasoning consisting of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion; for example, All
humans are mortal, the major premise, I am a human, the minor premise, therefore, I am
mortal, the conclusion." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2006), availableat
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/syllogism.
2See infra Part mI.D.
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government's ability to argue that a defendant's silence is evidence of guilt or
lack of credibility. Part Ill will also describe court interpretations regarding the
probative value of silence. Part IV will explore what silence means outside the
legal context. This section will review the possible meanings of silence as
examined by scholars in other disciplines. Part V will propose a new addition
to the Federal Rules of Evidence that will provide greater limits on the
admissibility of evidence of a defendant's failure to communicate with law
enforcement officers. Part VI will conclude that basic evidentiary standards
and public policy considerations call for limitations on the use of a criminal
defendant's silence.
1I. THE TRADMONAL EVIDENTIARY USE OF SILENCE
At the outset, it is important to describe what constitutes silence. MerriamWebster's Dictionary of Law defines silence as "forbearance from speech or
comment.",3 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit defines silence as "the fact of
abstaining from speech.",4 For purposes of this Article, "silence" refers to a
defendant's failure to speak. The failure to speak can arise in several situations.
It could arise in response to an accusation of criminal conduct. Additionally, it
could arise where a defendant fails to report a crime or fails to offer an
exculpatory statement to law enforcement upon arrest. Typically, the
government uses a defendant's silence in one of the following ways: (1) to
establish a non-hearsay adoptive admission; (2) to impeach the defendant's
credibility as a witness; or (3) as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt.
A. Silence as Proofof an Adoptive Admission
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) allows for the admissibility of
"adoptive admissions" against a party-opponent. The rule states: "A statement
is not hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth." 5

3 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW (1996), availableat http://dictionary.
reference.com/browse/silence.
4 United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting THE NEw
SHORTER OxFoRD DICTIONARY 2861 (4th ed. 1993)).
5 FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(B). An adoptive admission technically meets the definition of
hearsay. For example, if A accuses B of killing C and B acknowledges the statement by
nodding, any later testimony about A's statement and B's adoption of the statement are out-ofcourt statements. If those statements are offered to prove that B killed C, then the statements
meet the definition of hearsay. See FED. R. Evm. 801(a)-(c).
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In essence, the adoptive admissions rule allows the statements of others to be
admitted against a party-opponent if the party-opponent has in some way
adopted the statement as his own. For example, the First Circuit found an
adoptive admission where a defense attorney admitted in open court that the6
defendant knew an accomplice had deposited a gun in the defendant's car.
The court found the attorney's admission to be attributable to the defendant
because the defendant stated during the same hearing that he agreed with the
statements made by his attorney.7 Although adoptive admissions technically
satisfy the definition of hearsay,8 the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
felt that adoptive admissions, like all other admissions, should be excluded
from the definition of hearsay "on the theory that their admissibility in evidence
is the result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions of
the hearsay rule." 9
While several types of verbal and nonverbal conduct may constitute proof
of a party-opponent's acquiescence or manifestation of belief in someone else's
statement, 10 a party-opponent's silence or failure to deny a statement may also
qualify as proof that the party has adopted the statement.11 Courts typically
apply three factors, or preconditions, that must be satisfied before a party may
introduce her opposing party's silence as proof of an adoptive admission. The
proponent of the evidence must show that: (1) the party heard and understood
the statement; (2) the circumstances naturally called for a response; and (3) the
party failed to respond.12 The failure to satisfy any one of these factors renders

6 See
7

United States v. Negr6n-Narvdez, 403 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2005).
1d.
8 See supra note 5.
9 FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee's note.
10See, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("When

[defendant's accomplice] told [an undercover officer] that he could get another rock of crack
from 'my buddy,' [defendant] immediately got up from his chair, walked over to a stash of crack
that was packaged for distribution, and began to open it. By that action, [defendant] indicated
his endorsement of [the accomplice's] statement."); United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120,
1124-25 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding that defendant's possession of an airline ticket was an
admission that defendant had traveled in interstate commerce because "possession of a written
statement becomes an adoption of its contents"); Wickliffe v. Duckworth, 574 F. Supp. 979,984
(N.D. Ind. 1983) ("The record is clear that petitioner adopted the admissions ....
[H]e
demonstrated his agreement by laughing, slapping hands with [the declarant] and nodding.").
" See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note ("When silence is relied upon,
the theory is that the person would, under the circumstances, protest the statement made in his
presence, if untrue.").
12 See United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 76 (1st Cir. 2007) ("[A] party's agreement with
a fact stated by another may be inferred from (or 'adopted' by) silence.., when (i) a statement
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the silence less probative on the issue of whether the party adopted the
statement at all. 1 3 For example, if the evidence demonstrates that the defendant
did not hear the statement, then her silence lacks any probative value. Thus, the
proponent of the adoptive admission must meet each of the three requirements.
B. Silence as Impeachment Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 613 allows for the impeachment of trial witnesses
through prior inconsistent statements.1 4 Where a witness's trial testimony is
inconsistent with a prior statement made by the witness, opposing counsel may
cross-examine the witness regarding the inconsistency or introduce actual proof
of the prior inconsistency. 15 This line of questioning is not used to demonstrate
the truth of the prior statement, 16 but to show the witness's lack of credibility.
As the First Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:
In our view, Rule 613(b) applies when two statements, one made at trial and
one made previously, are irreconcilably at odds. In such an event, the crossexaminer is permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence if
necessary-not to demonstrate which of the two is true but, rather, to show
that the two
do not jibe (thus calling the declarant's credibility into
17
question).

is made in a party's presence, (ii) the nature of the statement is such that it normally would
induce the party to respond, and (iii) the party nonetheless fails to take exception." (internal
quotations omitted)); see also United States v. Ward, 377 F.3d 671,675 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 310 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945,950
(9th Cir. 1985).
13The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence define the "probative value" of evidence in
the following manner: "The standard of probability under the rule is 'more ... probable than
[the fact in dispute] would be without the evidence."' FED. R. Evil. 401 advisory committee's
note.
14 FED. R. EviD. 613.
15id.
16 In

order to use a prior inconsistent statement for its truthfulness, the proponent of the

evidence must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), which excludes from the
definition of hearsay prior inconsistent statements "given under oath subject to the penalty of

perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition."
17United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 558 (1st Cir. 1999); see also 1 JOHN W.
STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 34, at 126 (5th ed. 1999) ("The attack by prior
inconsistent statement is not based on the theory that the present testimony is false and the
former statement is true but rather upon the notion that talking one way on the stand and another
way previously is blowing hot and cold, raising a doubt as to the truthfulness of both
statements.").
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The Supreme Court has held that a defendant's silence can be used as
impeachment evidence and may sometimes qualify as a prior inconsistent
statement. In Raffel v. United States,18 the Court held that a defendant who
invoked his privilege against self-incrimination in his first trial yet chose to take
the stand during his second trial could be impeached with his prior failure to
testify.19 During Raffel's first trial for conspiracy to violate the National
Prohibition Act, he listened to testimony by a prohibition agent that Raffel
admitted owning a bar that served alcohol. Raffel did not testify during that
trial, and the jury deadlocked. 20 During Raffel's second trial, the same
prohibition agent testified regarding Raffel's admission, and Raffel took the
stand and testified that he had never made such a statement. 21 On crossexamination, the court asked Raffel why he failed to take the stand in his own
defense during the first trial. 22 Raffel was convicted following the second
trial.23 On appeal, the Court held that the prosecutor's questions were
permissible.2 4 The Court found that by taking the stand, Raffel opened himself
up to cross-examination and impeachment.2 5 The Court also noted that Raffel's
cross-examination may have been probative of his credibility "if the crossexamination had revealed that the real reason for the defendant's failure to
contradict the government's testimony on the first trial was a lack of faith in the
truth or probability of his own story., 26 Thus, the Supreme Court found that
under certain circumstances, a defendant's silence may be inconsistent with
claims of innocence made at trial.
The Court has not always found silence to qualify as a prior inconsistent
statement. In Grunewaldv. UnitedStates,27 the Court held that a defendant's
invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during grand jury proceedings
could not be used to impeach his trial testimony. 8 In Grunewald, the Court
failed to see how the defendant's silence during the grand jury hearing was
contradictory to his trial testimony proclaiming his innocence. 29 Indeed, the

18

271 U.S. 494 (1926).

'9Id. at 497.
2
0 Id.at 495.
21 id.
22 id.
23 id.
24
25

26

27

id.
Id. at 497.
Id.at 498.
353 U.S. 391 (1957).

2

1 Id.at 424.

29

Id.at 421-22.
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Court found the defendant's silence to be "wholly consistent with innocence.
In distinguishing its holding in Grunewaldfrom its holding in Raffel, the Court
found that the Raffel decision did not concern itself with the probative value of
the impeachment evidence. Rather, Raffel focused on the constitutionality of
impeaching a defendant regarding his prior silence. 31 The GrunewaldCourt
held that although the line of questioning regarding the defendant's grand jury
silence was constitutional, it was not probative on the issue of the defendant's
credibility and was therefore inadmissible.32 In accord with the Grunewald
holding, subsequent decisions regarding the admissibility of silence to impeach
a defendant-witness's credibility have turned on whether the courts found the
silence to have some probative value as a statement inconsistent with a
defendant's trial testimony. 33 As the Supreme Court has noted, "[i]f the
Government fails to establish a threshold inconsistency between silence at the
police station and later exculpatory testimony at trial, proof of silence lacks any
significant probative value and therefore must be excluded. 34
C. Silence as Substantive Evidence of Guilt
At times, courts have allowed the use of a defendant's silence against her as
proof of her guilt for the crime charged. In the civil context, the Supreme Court
has held that a jury may infer culpability from a party's failure to testify at trial,
even where the party's silence is due to her invocation of the self-incrimination

30

Id. at 421.

3' Id. at
32

420.
1d. at 421.
33 See United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1975) ("Petitioner here had no reason
to think that any explanation he might make would hasten his release.... In light of the many
alternative explanations for his pretrial silence, we do not think it sufficiently probative of an
inconsistency with his in-court testimony to warrant admission of evidence thereof."). But see
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 621-22 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If defendants had been
framed, their failure to mention that fact at the time of their arrest is almost inexplicable; for that
reason, under accepted rules of evidence, their silence is tantamount to a prior inconsistent
statement and admissible for purposes of impeachment."); United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d
869, 874 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Under certain circumstances, a witness's prior silence regarding
critical facts may constitute a prior inconsistent statement where failure to mention those matters
... conflict[s] with that which is later recalled." (internal quotations omitted)); Dennis v. United
States, 346 F.2d 10, 17-18 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'don othergrounds, 384 U.S. 855 (1966) ("In
determining variances or inconsistencies we should remember that flat contradictions are not the
only test of inconsistency. Omissions of fact ... may be relevant to the process of testing
credibility of a witness' [s] trial testimony.").
34
Hale, 422 U.S. at 176.
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privilege.35 In the criminal context, government attorneys violate the
36
Constitution by commenting on a defendant's failure to testify at trial;
however, they can argue that a defendant's failure to ask questions or show
emotion upon being arrested 37 tends to demonstrate consciousness of guilt for
the crime charged.38 Wigmore provides an explanation for the value courts
traditionally place on evidence of silence:
A failure to assert a fact, when it would have been natural to assert it,
amounts in effect to an assertion of the non-existence of the fact.... There
may be explanations indicating that the person had in truth
39 no belief of that
tenor, but the conduct is "prima facie" an inconsistency.
Wigmore's rationale is based on the assumption that it is natural for one to
protest false accusations or to proclaim innocence in the face of arrest. This
Article seeks to highlight circumstances where it is actually more natural to
remain silent than to protest. If such circumstances exist, then the major
premise of the "silence indicates guilt" syllogism breaks down, courts must call
the probative value of silence into question, and, most importantly, jurors'
assumptions about the meaning of silence may be completely incorrect.
In the context of criminal cases, the government's use of a defendant's
silence triggers concerns regarding the defendant's privilege against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 4° The next section of this Article
will explore jurisprudence assessing what effect, if any, the self-incrimination
privilege and the reading of Miranda warnings have on the probative value of a
defendant's silence.

35 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) ("[The Fifth Amendment does
not

forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response
to probative evidence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference

where the privilege is claimed by a party to a Civil cause."' (quoting 8 WIGMORE,

EVIDENCE §

439 (McNaughton rev. 1961))).
36 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (finding that comment
on
defendant's refusal to testify "is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional
privilege" and "cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly").
37
See United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005).
38 id.
39 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042 (Chadboum rev. 1970), quoted in Baxter, 425

U.S. at
319 n.3.
40 The Fifth Amendment states that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Ill. SILENCE IN THE FACE OF MIRANDA AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Fifth Amendment's grant of a criminal defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination greatly complicates the issue of whether a defendant's silence
should be used against him. The drafters of the adoptive admissions rule
recognized that the potential impact the rule might have on the selfincrimination privilege was "troublesome" because a criminal defendant's
silence could be motivated by advice of counsel or exercise of the selfincrimination privilege. 4' However, the drafters felt that the Supreme Court
resolved any potential conflicts and decided not to include a limitation on the
use of a criminal defendant's silence.42 Today, the constitutionality of the use
of a criminal defendant's silence turns on whether the silence occurs prior or
subsequent to arrest and the reading of Miranda warnings, which inform a
criminal defendant of his right against self-incrimination.43 This Article does
not seek to debate whether the use of a criminal defendant's silence is
constitutional based on when the silence occurs during the arrest and
interrogation process. Rather, it will address what effect the constitutional
guarantees embodied in Miranda,and the self-incrimination privilege, have on
the probative value of the silence.
A. Post-Arrest,Post-MirandaSilence
The Supreme Court has weighed in on the constitutionality of
governmental use of a criminal defendant's silence when the silence occurs
following arrest and the reading of Mirandawarnings. In Doyle v. Ohio,44 the
Court held that courts are barred from admitting evidence of a defendant's
silence for impeachment purposes when the silence occurs post-arrest and postMiranda.45 In Doyle, the defendants were accused of selling marijuana. 4 Each
defendant took the stand in his own defense and testified that he had been

41 FED. R. EvlD. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note.
42 id.

43 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966) ("Prior to any [custodial interrogation],

the [accused] must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.").
U.S. 610 (1976).
44
451426
Id. at 619 ("We hold that the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the
time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
46Id. at 611.
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framed by the true seller of the drugs. 47 On cross-examination, the prosecutor
asked each defendant why he had not told law enforcement of the frame-up at
the time of arrest. 48 The questions drew objections from defense counsel, but
the trial court allowed the line of questioning. 49 The trial court also allowed the
prosecution to argue during closing argument that the defendants' silence
following arrest was evidence that the frame-up story was untrue.50 In finding
that the questions and comments on the defendants' post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence were unconstitutional, the Supreme Court reasoned that it would be
patently unfair to assure a defendant of his right to remain silent during arrest
and subsequently use the defendant's silence against him at trial. 51 For this
reason, the Court held that the use of the defendants' silence following the
reading of Miranda violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
B. Post-Arrest,Pre-MirandaSilence
Often, the government will seek to use a defendant's silence against her
when the silence occurs after arrest but before the reading of Miranda
warnings. 3 The constitutionality of this practice may turn on the purpose for

47

Id. at 612-13.
"Id. at 613.
49Id.at 613-14.
50
Id. at 614 n.5.
51Id. at 618. ("[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the
warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due
process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently
offered
at trial.").
5
2 Id. at 619. Although Doyle concerned the use of silence as impeachment evidence,
a
later Supreme Court decision held that post-Mirandasilence could not be used to disprove a
defendant's insanity defense. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986). Lower
courts have interpreted Greenfieldto hold that post-Mirandasilence cannot be used to establish
a defendant's guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1110 (8th Cir. 2005)
("The [Greenfield]Court held that [post-Mirandasilence] evidence, like that at issue in Doyle,
was inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt because it is equally unfair to promise an
arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and then use that silence to
overcome his plea of insanity.").
53Contrary to popular belief, law enforcement is not required to advise an arrestee of her
Mirandarights until custodial interrogation commences. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966). Therefore, it is constitutionally permissible for law enforcement officers to make an
arrest without reading Mirandawarnings.
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which the government seeks to use the evidence. In Fletcherv. Weir,54 the
Supreme Court found no constitutional violation in a prosecutor's decision to
cross-examine a defendant about his post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.55 The
defendant in Fletcher was charged with intentional murder, but at trial he
testified that he killed the victim in self-defense. 56 On cross-examination, the
prosecutor questioned the defendant on his failure to offer his self-defense story
to the officers who arrested him.57 Ultimately, the jury found the defendant
guilty of murder. 58 He appealed, claiming, based on Doyle, that the
prosecutor's line of questioning regarding his post-arrest silence violated his
due process rights. 59 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that "[i]n the
absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda
warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to
permit cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to
take the stand." 6 The Court's ruling established a bright line: Where a
defendant-witness's silence precedes the reading of Miranda warnings, the
government may use the silence to impeach the defendant at trial.
The Court has never addressed the issue of whether the government may
use a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to establish guilt for the
crime charged. However, the circuit courts have continuously debated this
issue. The Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the use of a
defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence triggers no constitutional
concerns. 61 In UnitedStates v. Frazier,62 the Eighth Circuit addressed whether
the government could argue that the defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence implied he was guilty of drug possession.63 In Frazier,the government
64
did not use evidence of the defendant's silence to impeach his testimony.
Rather, the prosecutor elicited evidence of the defendant's silence from one of
the arresting officers and later argued during closing argument that the

54
55 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
56

Id.at 607.
Id.at 603-04.

57Id.
5
' Id. at

604.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 607.
61 See United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005); United States
v.
Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (1 th Cir. 1991); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th
Cir. 1985).
62 408 F.3d at 1102.
63

Id. at 1109.

64The opinion does not indicate whether the defendant testified on his own behalf.
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defendant's failure to get upset, angry, combative, or emotional during his
arrest reflected his guilt. 65 The defendant argued on appeal that the
government's actions violated his privilege against self-incrimination. 66 The
Eighth Circuit found no violation of the defendant's self-incrimination
privilege. The court found that, unlike the situation in Doyle, there was no
governmental action that induced the defendant's silence. 7 Because law
enforcement did not inform the defendant of his right to remain silent, the
Fraziercourt found that the use of his silence during the government's case-inchief did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 68 The Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits agree that the government may comment on defendants' post69
arrest silence so long as law enforcement has not read Miranda warnings.
The D.C. and Ninth Circuits wholeheartedly disagree with the view that the
government may use a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence against
him.70 These courts reason that although Miranda warnings are a procedural
safeguard in place to ensure that arrestees are advised of their Fifth Amendment
rights, the warnings "are not the genesis of those rights.",71 Rather, an arrestee
possesses the right to remain silent upon being taken into custody and
questioned by law enforcement, even if he has not been advised of his Miranda
rights.7 2 These circuits hold that the issue of whether an arrestee is advised of
his rights is immaterial. Instead, these courts are concerned with whether the
arrestee invoked his privilege against self-incrimination.7 3 According to the
D.C. Circuit, an arrestee who remains silent must be treated as having asserted
his privilege, and any prosecutorial comment on that invocation places undue

65 Frazier,408 F.3d at 1109.
66

id.

at 1111.
68id.
69 See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) ("Yet, even if
67 Id.

[defendant] was in custody at that time, the government could comment on her silence...
because she had not yet been given her Miranda warnings."); United States v. Love, 767 F.2d
1052,701063 (4th Cir. 1985).
See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 387 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
71Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029; accordMoore, 104 F.3d at 385 ("[N]either Miranda
nor any other case suggests that a defendant's protected right to remain silent attaches only upon
the commencement of questioning as opposed to custody.").
72 Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029.
73Id. at 1028-29; see also United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.
1991) (pre-arrest, pre-Mirandacase) ("Whether Mr. Burson was advised of his privilege against
self-incrimination is immaterial. What is important is that Mr. Burson clearly was not going to
answer any of the agents' questions.").
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burden on the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 74 The D.C.
Circuit also noted that any contrary finding "would create an incentive for
arresting officers to delay interrogation in order to create
an intervening
'silence' that could then be used against the defendant. 7 1
The D.C. and Ninth Circuits do not believe that their stance on the
substantive use of post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence calls into question the
holdings of Doyle and Fletcher.76 While the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits cite Doyle and Fletcher as support for the position that post-arrest
silence is fair game for prosecutors so long as Mirandawarnings have not been
given,77 circuits holding the opposite opinion argue that Fletcherand Doyle are
distinguishable because they addressed the use of silence as impeachment
evidence rather than as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. 78 Thus, it

seems that in these jurisdictions, a defendant can prevent use of her post-arrest,
pre-Mirandasilence by electing not to testify at trial and thereby subject herself
to impeachment through cross-examination. 79
C. Pre-Arrest,Pre-MirandaSilence
The third context in which these issues arise is the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
context. In this situation, the criminal defendant is not facing custodial
interrogation by law enforcement such that Miranda warnings would be
required. Indeed, at the moment the criminal defendant is silent, he may not

74

Moore, 104 F.3d at 385.
75 id.
76 Fora discussion of Doyle and Fletcher,see supra Parts II.A and HIL.B.
77 See United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982)); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citing Fletcher);United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (citing Doyle v.
Ohio,7 426 U.S. 610 (1976), and Fletcher).
1 See Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029 n. 1 ("Doyle referred to the use
of post-arrest, postMirandasilence for impeachment. The government may still use a defendant's post-arrest, preMiranda silence for impeachment (but not, as this opinion explains, in its case in chief)."
(internal citations omitted)); Moore, 104 F.3d at 387 ("The present case is not an impeachment
case, and neither Doyle nor Fletcher has anything to do with it.").
79
As the Supreme Court held, "a defendant who elects to testify in his own behalf waives
any Fifth Amendment objection to the use of his prior silence for the purpose of impeachment."
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,241 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (finding that the self-incrimination privilege "cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perury.... Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here
did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process.").
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even be a suspect. The Supreme Court has opined on the use of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence for impeachment purposes. In Jenkins v. Anderson,80 the
defendant was charged with first-degree murder. He was not arrested until he
turned himself in to law enforcement some two weeks following the killing.8 1
At trial, the defendant testified that he killed the victim in self-defense. 2
During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the defendant about his
failure to report the killing to the police or to turn himself in immediately after
the killing occurred. 83 During closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced the
defendant's testimony where he admitted he remained silent for two weeks
following the killing to support the government's argument that the defendant
killed to retaliate rather than to defend himself.
On appeal, the defendant argued that this use of his pre-arrest silence was
unconstitutional.8 5 The Court held that the impeachment was proper because it
"follows the defendant's own decision to cast aside his cloak of silence."8 6 The
Court ruled that a defendant may protect his privilege against self-incrimination
by not testifying at trial.87 However, once the defendant decides to take the
stand, "[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of the courts
of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of
considerations determining the scope and limits of the privilege against selfincrimination., 88 In addition to finding no violation of the defendant's selfincrimination privilege, the Jenkins Court also ruled that the use of the
defendant's pre-arrest silence did not violate his due process rights because,
unlike the situation in Doyle, no government action had induced the defendant
to remain silent before his arrest. 89 The Jenkins Court expressly noted that its
holding was limited to the use of pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes
only. 90 It left unanswered the question of whether pre-arrest silence could be
used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt.

80447 U.S. 231 (1980).
81 Id. at

232.
Id.
83 Id. at 233.
4 Id. at 234.
85 Id. at 235.
86 Id. at 238.
87 id.
82

88
89

Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958)).
Id. at 240.

90 Id. at 236 n.2.
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In the absence of a ruling from the Supreme Court on the issue of whether
the government may make substantive use of a defendant's pre-arrest silence,
the circuit courts have issued divergent rulings. Clearly, circuit courts that
apply the bright-line rule that no violation occurs in the post-arrest, preMirandacontext would likely find no violation in the pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
context, because neither situation involves the use of silence following the
reading of the warnings. 91 Some jurisdictions that have found a constitutional
violation in the substantive use of a defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence have not found such a violation where the silence occurs prior to arrest.
In United States v. Oplinger,92 the Ninth Circuit found that the government's
use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as proof of guilt does not trigger
constitutional concerns. 93 The court reasoned that, unlike the post-arrest, preMiranda situation, a defendant who has not yet been arrested is "under no
94
official compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain silent."
The First, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have found that the
substantive use of pre-arrest silence violates a defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination." These courts found Doyle and Fletcherinapplicable 96 and
instead have opted to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Griffin v.
97 In Griffin,
California.
the Court held that neither the prosecutor nor the court
may invite the jury to infer guilt from a defendant's failure to testify at trial. 98
The Seventh Circuit held that Griffin's prohibition on comments regarding a
defendant's silence at trial also extends to silence occurring before trial and
before arrest. 99 The Seventh Circuit found that because the privilege against
self-incrimination attaches long before trial, non-testifying defendants should
feel assured that evidence of their silence, regardless of when it occurs during
the investigatory and adjudicative process, will not be used against them. 1°°

91See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
92150 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1998).

93Id. at 1067.
94Id. at 1066 (internal quotations omitted).
95See Combs

v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burson, 952

F.2d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989);
Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987).
96This was because Doyle and Fletcher involved using silence as impeachment evidence
rather than as evidence of a defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Combs, 205 F.3d at 281.
97380

98

U.S. 609 (1965).

1d. at 613.
99Savory, 832 F.2d at 1017.
1 Id.at 1017-18; accord Coppola, 878 F.2d at 1568 (finding a constitutional violation
where prosecution offered defendant's statement to police that he was not going to confess
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The Sixth Circuit agrees with this rationale, holding that "[i]n a prearrest setting
as well as in a post-arrest setting, it is clear that a potential defendant's
comments could
provide damaging evidence that might be used in a criminal
11
prosecution."' 0
The circuit split on the proper use of pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence can be
explained, at least in part, by whether a jurisdiction interprets impeachment
evidence and substantive evidence of guilt as similar or dissimilar. Circuits
finding that pre-arrest silence is not protected do not draw an actual distinction
between impeachment and guilt evidence. Instead, those courts look for the
existence of some type of government action, like the arrest of the defendant or
the reading of Miranda warnings, that might convince the defendant that he
should remain silent. 102 On the other hand, circuits that find it constitutionally
impermissible to use substantive evidence of a defendant's silence universally
find that substantive use requires more protection than impeachment use.1°3
Unless the defendant opened himself up to impeachment by testifying at trial,
these courts believe that use of the pre-arrest silence actually punishes the
defendant for invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. 10 4 At least one
circuit has argued that substantive use of pre-arrest silence places great pressure
upon a defendant to waive his privilege against self-incrimination:
Because in the case of substantive use a defendant cannot avoid the
introduction of his past silence by refusing to testify, the defendant is under
substantial pressure to waive the privilege against self-incrimination either
upon first contact with police or later at trial in order to explain the prior
silence. 105

With this constitutional framework for analyzing silence, it is important to
explore the probative value of silence. The next section will explore court
decisions addressing the meaning of silence from an evidentiary standpoint.

because the non-testifying defendant did not offer an exculpatory story at trial but "relied on the
protection guaranteed by the [F]ifth [A]mendment from the first police interrogation through

trial").
10' Combs, 205 F.3d at 283.
102See United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 1998).
103 See

supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.

104id.
105Combs, 205 F.3d at 285.
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D. Court DecisionsAssessing the Probative Value of Silence
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the probative value of silence in
determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. Before considering
interpretations of silence from other disciplines, it is important to examine what
weight the courts place upon a defendant's silence. The opinions vary greatly,
for even the Supreme Court has contradictory pronouncements regarding the
value of silence. In Grunewald v. United States,1' 6 the Court held that a
defendant's invocation of his self-incrimination privilege carried very little
evidentiary value as compared to the risk that the evidence would unfairly
prejudice the defendant.'1 7 The Court noted that it was natural for a defendant
to remain silent before the grand jury because it was clear that he was a
potential defendant. 10 8 The Court found that even though many believe
invocation of the privilege indicates a defendant's guilt,1°9 in reality it was
"quite consistent with innocence [for a defendant] to refuse to provide evidence
which could be used by the Government in building its incriminating chain." 110
Ultimately, the Grunewald Court found that evidence of a defendant's silence
during grand jury proceedings should not have been offered against him at
trial.l"' Similarly, Justice Marshall, dissenting in Jenkins v. Anderson, argued
that a defendant's failure to report a crime could carry many meanings:
It is conceivable that a person who had acted in self-defense might believe
that he had committed no crime and therefore had no call to explain himself
to the police. Indeed, all the witnesses agreed that after the stabbing the
victim ran across the street and climbed a flight of stairs before collapsing.
Initially, at least, then,
petitioner might not have known that there was a
112
homicide to explain.
At other times, the Court has found evidence of silence to be quite
important. In Baxter v. Palmigiano,11 3 where the Court held that a civil party's

06 353 U.S. 391 (1952).
07

1 Id. at 424. The Court was engaging in an analysis under Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
which allows a court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to a party. FED. R. Evm. 403; see
also infra Part V.A.
08
Grunewald,353 U.S. at 423.
09Id.at 421.
" Id. at 423.
' Id. at 424.
112 447
113425

U.S. 231, 248 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
U.S. 308 (1976).
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invocation of her privilege against self-incrimination could be used against
her, 14 it noted that "[s]ilence is often evidence of the most persuasive
character.""15 Likewise, in his concurring opinion in Jenkins, Justice Stevens
value in
suggested that the failure to report a crime did carry some probative
6
assessing whether a defendant's self-defense story was credible."
It must be noted that the reading of Miranda warnings has a significant
impact on the probative value of silence. In addition to addressing the
constitutionality of the government's actions, the Doyle Court also discussed7
the evidentiary value of silence following the reading of Mirandawarnings.T
The Court found post-Mirandasilence "insolubly ambiguous."' a Rather than
serving as impeachment evidence, silence following Miranda "may be nothing
more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights."" 9 The Doyle
Court's argument about the probative value of silence is equally true if the
purpose of the evidence is to establish substantive guilt or an adoptive
admission. The reading of Mirandawarnings destroys any probative value that
silence might otherwise carry. In United States v. Hale,120 a Supreme Court
case decided one year prior to Doyle, the Court found that an arrestee' s silence
means very little, since "he is under no duty to speak and, as in this case, has
ordinarily been advised by government authorities only moments earlier that he
has a right to remain silent, and that anything he does say can and will be used
against him in court."1 21 Thus, an arrestee's silence can "as easily be taken to
indicate reliance on the right to remain silent as to support an inference that the
explanatory testimony [offered at trial] was a later fabrication.' ' 122 Clearly,
post-Miranda silence carries very little evidentiary value in helping a jury
assess a defendant's credibility or determine his guilt or innocence.
A credible argument exists that the mere existence of the self-incrimination
privilege renders all silence in the face of law enforcement "insolubly

4

Id. at 318.
Id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted).
116 447 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("We need not hold that every citizen has a

11

115

duty to report every infraction of law that he witnesses in order to justify the drawing of a
reasonable inference from silence in a situation in which the ordinary citizen would normally
speak out.").
117 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
118 id.
119 Id.
20 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
121Id.
122

at 176.

Id. at 177.
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ambiguous."' 123 In Jenkins, Justice Marshall noted that arrestees may know of
their right to remain silent even before they are advised of their Mirandarights,
especially where the defendant has previously been arrested. 2 4 Indeed, the
Sixth Circuit noted that defendants may remain silent prior to arrest because
they know of their right to remain silent.125 The statement of rights has become
so ubiquitous that many Americans can probably recite the Miranda warnings
from memory. To be sure, citizens' knowledge of their constitutional right to
remain silent without a warning from law enforcement is a good thing;
however, this widespread knowledge undermines
the major premise that
126
innocence.
their
proclaim
always
people
innocent
According to the drafters of the adoptive admissions rule, any assessment
of the probative value of silence requires "an evaluation in terms of probable
human behavior.'' 1 7 Let us now engage in that evaluation based on research
conducted by those better equipped than most in their ability to assess human
behavior: psychology, sociology, and communications experts.
IV. WHAT SILENCE REALLY MEANS

The reader might wonder why exploration of the meaning of silence is
necessary. As previously stated, the Supreme Court has made pronouncements
about the conclusions a jury might infer from a defendant's silence. This
Article argues that common sense assumptions about the meaning of silence
may very well be incorrect. Psychology professor George Dudycha explains in
detail the differences between common sense assumptions and justified
conclusions based on scientific psychology. 128 Dudycha argues that while
common sense expects a person to jump to conclusions, psychology uses the
scientific method and requires "one [to] suspend judgment until the facts fairly
speak for themselves.' ' 129 Dudycha provides the following example of

123Doyle,
124

426 U.S. at 617.
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Since we

cannot assume that in the absence of official warnings individuals are ignorant ofor oblivious to
their constitutional rights, we must recognize that petitioner may have acted in reliance on the
constitutional guarantee. In fact, petitioner had most likely been informed previously of his
privilege against self-incrimination, since he had two prior felony convictions.").
125 Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000).
126 See supra Part I.
127 FED. R. EviD. 801 (d)(2)(B) advisory committee's note.
128 George Dudycha, What is Psychology?, in PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFIcERS 1,4-5 (George Dudycha ed. 1973).
129

Id. at 4.
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erroneous conclusions based on common sense: "A person who refuses to talk
must be guilty. This idea is commonly held. And certainly at times it may be
true, but to jump to the conclusion that it is always true, without considering the
other factors that may lead to blocking, indicates a lack of scientific
restraint."'' 30 The use of research from other disciplines necessarily informs the
discussion on the probative value of silence. As Professors Robert Hutchins
and Donald Slesinger observed, "[b]y careful use of [scientists'] proved results
in these and other fields, we may yet build
a law of evidence more closely
' 31
related to the facts of human behavior."'
A. "I'm Silent Because IAm Guilty."
The most common interpretation of silence, and the one used by many
courts and lawmakers, is that silence is evidence of a listener's agreement with
statements made by others. 132 Common sense dictates that individuals speak
when they disagree and remain silent when they agree. 13 3 However, as this
Article will demonstrate, courts and jurors must not always assume that silence
means assent. "Indeed, in some cultures and contexts, silence may actually
134
constitute disagreement or dissent with an adverse statement or condition."'
Thus, while silence can communicate a suspect's assent to accusations made by
law enforcement officers, it may also hold other meanings.
B. "Why Talk? They Won't Believe Me Anyway. "
Arrestees may remain silent in the face of accusations by police officers or
fail to report crimes to police officers because they think that proclaiming their
innocence is useless. They may believe that communication with law
enforcement will result in their arrest and conviction even if they are actually
innocent of any wrongdoing. Research demonstrates that many arrestees
believe law enforcement officers will deem them guilty even if they are
innocent. More importantly, social scientists have found that an arrestee's
claims of innocence may indeed mean nothing to law enforcement officers

130 Id.
131

Robert Hutchins & Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence -

Memory,
41 HARv. L. REV. 860, 873 (1928).
132 See supra Part H.
133See Stefan H. Krieger, A Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak: The Functionsof
Silence in the Lawyering Process, 80 OR. L. REV. 199, 220-21 (2001) (citing communications
scholars who agree that silence can be interpreted to mean agreement or assent).
'34 Id. at 248.
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because they are more inclined to presume guilt even when evidence of
innocence exists.
1. Public Perceptionsof Law Enforcement
Arrestees who are distrustful of law enforcement may believe that their
proclamations of innocence will be ignored and may therefore choose to remain
silent. While it would be an overstatement to argue that the public in general is
distrustful of law enforcement and the criminal justice system, sociologists
Ronald Weitzer and Steven Tuch found that an arrestee's race may affect his
perception of the criminal justice system. In 2002, Weitzer and Tuch surveyed
nearly 1800 U.S. residents to determine whether they perceived the criminal
justice system as fair and impartial. 135 The researchers found that the citizens'
perceptions divided along racial lines:
[B]lacks and Hispanics are also much more likely than whites to believe that
police prejudice is a problem. Three times as many blacks as whites believe
that police prejudice is "very common" throughout the U.S., and blacks are
about36six times as likely as whites to believe it is very common in their own
city. 1
In contrast, Weitzer and Tuch found that more than seventy-five percent of
whites surveyed believed that the American criminal justice system is
impartial. 137 In another study, Weitzer and Tuch found that race was a very
strong predictor of attitudes toward law enforcement even when they factored
in class. They found that middle-class and more highly educated blacks are
more critical of criminal justice agencies than lower-class blacks. 138 Ultimately,

135Ronald Weitzer & Steven Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen
Perceptions,
83 Soc. FORCES 1009, 1012 (2005).
136
Id.at 1017.
137
Id. at 1025. Weitzer and Tuch attributed the differences in perception to several factors,

including whether the respondents had personally experienced discrimination at the hands of the
police, whether the respondents knew someone who had been treated unfairly by the police, and
whether the respondents had seen media coverage of police abuse. Id. at 1026. The researchers
found that these factors were present with black and Hispanic respondents and absent from the
experiences of white respondents. Id.
138 Ronald Weitzer & Steven Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptionsof Discriminationby the
Police,45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 494, 502 (1999). Weitzer and Tuch argued that middle-class
blacks are more critical of law enforcement because they "are acutely aware of race-based
discrimination due to an expectation that class position should shield middle-class Blacks from
mistreatment." Id. They also theorized that "better educated Blacks are more cognizant of
racially charged mass-media events than are either less educated Blacks or better educated
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Weitzer and Tuch determined that, regardless of their socioeconomic status,
blacks "lack confidence in the ability of the police to treat individuals
impartially in their communities," 13 9 while whites "are more reluctant than
Blacks to acknowledge racism in American society, whether in the police or in
other institutions."' 14 0
Similarly, Weitzer found in a 1997 study that black residents in the
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area believed that, upon arrest, law enforcement
would presume them guilty because of their race. 141As one black respondent
stated, "[i]f you're black there's a presumption of guilt, a presumption of
wrongdoing if you're stopped.... The racial
problems in this country just filter
142
department."
police
the
to
down
on
right
These differences in perceptions of the police may explain why some
arrestees choose to remain silent. If arrestees believe they will receive unfair
treatment regardless of what they say, or if arrestees believe the police have
already decided their guilt, they may conclude that silence is their best option.
As the following two sections demonstrate, there is wide support for the belief
that police officers presume guilt prior to their interrogation of a suspect. If this
is true, then innocent arrestees probably should remain silent.
2. InvestigatorBias
Psychology professors Christian Meissner and Saul Kassin discovered
evidence of "investigator bias"-that is, "a tendency to perceive interview
suspects as guilty.', 143

Meissner and Kassin argue that law enforcement

investigators often presume the guilt of suspects prior to the commencement of
Whites. Greater exposure to controversial events involving the police and the larger criminal
justice system likely has the cumulative effect of reinforcing a critical perspective on these
institutions." Id. at 502-03.
139Id. at 503; see also Scott Wortley, John Hagan & Ross MacMillan, Just Des(s)erts?
The Racial Polarizationof Perceptionsof Criminal Justice, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 637, 647,
665 (1997) (finding that blacks are more likely to perceive bias and discrimination within the
criminal justice system than whites after accounting for class, education, income, and age and
speculating that "the legacy of slavery may lead blacks in both Canada and the United States to
distrust 'white' social institutions").
'40 Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 138, at 503.
141Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing:Residents' Perceptionsin Three Neighborhoods,
34 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 129, 131, 137-38 (2000).
142 Id. at 138.
143Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, You're Guilty So Just Confess!Cognitive and
BehavioralConfirmation Biases in the InterrogationRoom, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFES IoNs,
AND ENTRAPMENT 85, 89 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004).
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an interview or interrogation. Investigators then use the interview or
interrogation to confirm their suspicion of guilt.'" Meissner and Kassin also
found that once law enforcement investigators, like all other people, "form an
initial belief or expectation, they unwittingly search for, interpret, and create
subsequent information in ways that verify these existing beliefs, while
overlooking data that are contradictory."'' 45 The research indicates that police
training in the detection of truth increases the likelihood that law enforcement
officers will make premature determinations of guilt.'46 Additionally, Meissner
and Kassin found that although experienced law enforcement officers are more
likely to possess investigator bias and a high level of confidence in their initial
conclusions, they demonstrated no better than chance-level accuracy in their
determinations of guilt or innocence. 47
The concept of investigator bias breeds several negative consequences
when law enforcement investigators assume that an innocent person is guilty.
Principal among these is the risk of false confession. Research demonstrates
that investigator bias results in highly aggressive interrogation methods, and in
48
turn, those interrogation methods increase the risk of false confessions.
Other consequences of investigator bias include investigators "ask[ing] more
guilt-presumptive questions, more frequently judg[ing] the suspect to be guilty,
us[ing] more interrogation techniques, tr[ying] harder and exert[ing] more
pressure on suspects to confess, and ma[king] innocent suspects sound more
defensive and guilty to observers."' 149 A suspect facing such tactics will likely
become more nervous and defensive,150thereby confirming the investigator's
initial belief that the suspect is guilty.
3. Problemswith Deception Detection
Interrogation manuals provided to police officers list many factors that will
assist officers in determining whether a particular suspect is lying. These
14

4 Id. at 91.

145Id.

at 88; accordJAMES

MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLCT 10

(2d ed.

1980) ("[Psychology] treats perception itself as the individual's awareness of a 'thing' or
'happening' conditioned by his similar experiences in the past and designed to direct his
behavior in the future to be consistent with what he already knows.").
146 Meissner & Kassin, supra note 143, at 91.
141

Id. at 92.

14 Id. at 87. The false confession phenomenon is real. Innocence Project research states
that about 25 percent of all DNA exoneration cases involved false confessions. Id. at 86.
149 Id. at 95.
15 0Id.
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manuals indicate that the following behaviors are signs of guilt: posture shifts;
placing a hand over the mouth; jerky, abrupt, or swift movements; cold and
clammy hands; stuttering; mumbling; fidgeting; and scratching. 51 Empirical
research demonstrates that these behaviors are not indicators of guilt, but are an
illustration of common misconceptions about the link between nonverbal
conduct and deception. 152 Psychology researchers warn that investigators'
reliance on interrogation manuals will result in misinterpretations of suspects'
body language and may "fuel suspect-driven
investigations that might
153
ultimately result in miscarriages of justice."
Psychologists Par Anders Granhag and Aldert Vrij posit that investigators,
like all other people, are poor at detecting deception. 15 4 Granhag and Vrij
provide six reasons for investigators' poor lie-detection skills:
(1) They do not know which nonverbal cues indicate guilt and which ones
do not;
(2) They over-rely on the content of a suspect's statement rather than
analyzing how the suspect speaks;
(3) They are influenced by their bias;
(4) Their beliefs about the behavior of liars are incorrect;
155
(5) They believe any deviations from the norm indicate deception;
(6) Their lie-detection abilities are affected by their56own social-emotional
intelligence, which varies among investigators.
Clearly, an investigator's perceived inability to differentiate truth from nontruth might influence an arrestee in his decision to remain silent. Research
indicates a distinct possibility that a truthful, innocent arrestee may be
perceived as guilty and untrustworthy.
The above research confims that arrestees' perceptions of law enforcement
officers may sometimes be true. Thus, silence may better serve an arrestee,

151
Par Anders Granhag & Aldert Vrij, Deception Detection, in PSYCHOLOGYANDTHELAw
43, 49 (Neil Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005).
152 Id. at 49-50.
153 Id. at 50.
154
Id. at 64.
1
55Granhag and Vrij argue that "a baby-faced, extraverted, and 'nonweird' person is likely

to be judged
as truthful." Id.
156 Id. at 64-65.
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although he will necessarily find himself between the proverbial rock and hard
place: "Suspects are seemingly in a no win situation if they protest their
innocence[:] the interviewer merely takes this as confirmation of guilt. If they
say nothing, perhaps 57using their right to silence, this too is taken as
confirmation of guilt."1
C. "I Won't Let Them Trick Me into Confessing."
Arrestees and potential arrestees may remain silent to avoid being tricked
into confessing. Because false confessions are a reality in the American
criminal justice system, innocent and guilty individuals must recognize that
police interrogation could result in a confession. 158 Additionally, as
demonstrated in the previous section, many members of society distrust law
enforcement and believe that bias and discrimination are rampant. 59 This
section will address the "tricks" investigators sometimes employ to obtain a
confession.
In his book Psychology for Law Enforcement Officers, psychology
professor Dudycha advises officers to avoid "yes or no" questions and to opt
instead for open-ended questions. 6° To illustrate his point, he discusses the
quintessential trick question, "Do you still beat your wife?" Dudycha states
that this is a trick question because a suspect who has never beaten his wife
cannot answer the question with a yes or a no. If he says yes, he admits that he
161
beats his wife. If he says no, he admits that he beat his wife in the past.
Psychiatrist Gisli Gudjonsson argues that the question "Do you still beat your
wife?" is leading because it is based on the assumption that the interviewee is
married and has beat his wife in the past.' 62 Gudjonsson claims that if the
investigator's assumptions are incorrect or uninformed, then her use of the
leading question might result in the interviewee admitting guilt when he is
actually innocent.163 According to Gudjonsson, closed-end, leading questions

157 Stephen Moston, From Denial to Admission in Police Questioning of Suspects, in
PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND

PRACTICE 91, 92-93 (Graham Davies et al. eds., 1996).
158 See Messiner & Kassin, supra note 143, at 86-87; see also supra Part IV.B.2.
159 See supra Part IV.B.
160 See Dudycha, supra note 128, at 67, 79.
161

162

Id.

GisLI H.

GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND

TESTIMONY 12 (1993). Gudjonsson defines a leading question as "the type of question that

indicates the wanted answer." Id.
163 Id.
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increase the likelihood that the interviewee will agree with an inaccurate
premise.164
Gudjonsson's research demonstrates that an arrestee could be fooled into
admitting information that is untrue. Still, one might argue that arrestees are
overly concerned with the risk that their words can be turned against them. The
research in this area demonstrates that arrestees should be concerned because
"[p]sychological deception has replaced physical coercion as one of the most
165
salient, defining features of contemporary police interrogation."
Criminologist Richard Leo studied the increasingly deceptive nature of police
interviews and interrogations and found that "police questioning now consists
of subtle and sophisticated psychological ploys, tricks, stratagems, techniques,
and methods that rely on manipulation, persuasion, and deception for their
efficacy."' 166 Leo found several common methods of deception. Those methods
include (1) misrepresenting the purpose or nature of the questioning, which can
be accomplished by informing the suspect that he can leave at any time, thereby
turning a custodial interrogation into a non-custodial interrogation; (2)
misrepresenting the seriousness of the alleged crime, which might occur where
an investigator convinces a murder suspect that the victim is still alive; (3)
misrepresenting the moral seriousness of the crime by telling the suspect that
his actions were justified or that he is not responsible for his actions; (4)
misrepresenting the investigator's identity by having the investigator pose as a
priest, lawyer, news reporter, or psychologist; this tactic allows the interrogation
to begin without the suspect's knowledge; and (5) the fabrication of evidence,
which might occur if the investigator tells the suspect that he has been
identified by someone else or that law enforcement has DNA or fingerprint
evidence against him. 167 Leo's research serves as a wake-up call for anyone
who believes that psychological deception is not a part of police interviewing
and interrogation. To avoid psychological manipulation and a possible false
confession, arrestees may choose to remain silent.

1

64Id. at 12-13.

165 Richard

A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police

Interrogation in America, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND PoLIcING 65 (Richard

A. Leo & George C. Thomas Ill eds., 1998).
166 id.
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D. "I Want to Assert My Power. I'm in Control."
Rather than indicating an arrestee's guilt, silence might reflect the
arrestee's desire to remain in control. Researchers in the communications field
68
found that silence can be used to communicate an assertion of power.'
According to one commentator, "In situations when speech is expected, a
communicator, by refraining from words, can attempt to take control of the
discourse. She communicates, in essence, 'As much as you may want me to
respond, I'm just not going to do it!" ' 169 Communications research indicates
that a suspect in custody may decide to remain silent to challenge the questioner
and send her a message that she cannot force the suspect to talk. 7
Psychological research accords with communications research. Feminist
psychologist Maureen Mahoney argues that women can successfully assert their
power by remaining silent at times.' 7' Mahoney states that silence is often used
when a speaker is too embarrassed to make certain statements. According to
Mahoney, silence is a powerful tool in shielding the speaker from shame or
ridicule. 172 The risk of shame or embarrassment provides some justification for
arrestees' silence. If Mahoney's premise is correct, arrestees may choose to
remain silent so that they can avoid disclosing information that may be noncriminal but embarrassing. Silence therefore allows arrestees to control the
dispensation of private information.
Mahoney also notes that silence can be a very powerful tool in resisting
"unwelcome probing."' 173 Mahoney tells the story of researchers who traveled
to a school to study its students. The girls at the school did not like the
presence of the researchers and chose not to answer any of the researchers'
questions as a silent protest of sorts.174 Mahoney found the protest was a very
effective way of communicating that the researchers were unwelcome. 175
Again, one could analogize the situation of arrestees or potential arrestees to the
girls in Mahoney's study. If officers go to a suspect's home and attempt to

'

Krieger, supra note 133, at 224 (citing Dennis Kurzon, When Silence May Mean Power,

18 J. PRAGMATICS 92 (1992)).
'69
Id. at 224-25.
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1 Id. at 225 (citing Kurzon, supra note 168, at 94).
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172 Id. at 605.
7 Id. at 614.
17 4 Id. at 613.
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question her, the suspect may respond with silence in order to protest the
unwelcome intrusion into her home. Additionally, the suspect may find some
of the officers' questions offensive and might respond to those questions with
silence to indicate her distaste for them.
Arrestees may choose to remain silent to change the power dynamic
between the police officers and themselves. As Mahoney recognized, "Silence,
can be a healthy response . . . to a sense of being
or not communicating,
176
controlled."'

E. "I Refuse to Talk Because I'm Angry or I'm Afraid."
Arrestees may decide to remain silent because they are angry. Gudjonsson
notes that both innocent and guilty suspects may become angry during
interviews or interrogations. 177 He states that "innocent suspects may be
genuinely angry, and on occasions outraged, about being accused or suspected
of a crime of which they are innocent."' 78 Likewise, guilty suspects may feign
anger or outrage to convince others of their innocence. 17 9 Psychological
researchers have noted that some differences exist between the anger of the
innocent and the anger of the guilty, including duration of time. Innocent
suspects will remain angry over a longer period of time than guilty suspects
IS
because guilty suspects will find it difficult to sustain the emotion over time.
Because -innocent suspects could potentially remain angry with law
enforcement authorities over long periods of time, their anger may result in
silence. Communications researchers found that angry people use silence as a
weapon. 18' Angry people often use silence to sustain a conflict. According to
one commentator, "[u]se of the 'silent treatment' sends a message of
indifference or even outright disdain for the party, her conduct, or her position
on an issue.,' 82 Indeed, "silent treatment of the opponent may be even more
' 83
powerful than uttering the harshest of words and drives many people crazy.

1761d. at 617.
177 GisLI
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Innocent but angry arrestees may decide to use the silent treatment to upset the
investigator or communicate their dislike. While this conduct may be
counterproductive, it does not reflect the arrestee's guilt.
Arrestees may also remain silent because they are afraid. Gudjonsson notes
that innocent and guilty suspects alike may be fearful and nervous during police
questioning.'" He lists three reasons why innocent people may be nervous
when questioned: "(1) they may be worried that they are erroneously assumed
to be guilty; (2) they may be worried about what is going to happen to them
whilst in custody and during interrogation; (3) they may be concerned that the
police may discover some previous transgressions."' 185 He also notes that the
innocent and the guilty are under a certain level of stress when they enter the
police station. They are stressed by the environment itself. 86 If they have
never been to a police station before, they may be jarred by the lack of free
movement and the invasion of their personal space. 87 Psychology professor
Donald Lindsley argues that innocent and guilty suspects are fearful of what
might happen if they are perceived as guilty. 188 He discovered that repeat
offenders will have much less fear of the consequences of guilt as compared to
an "innocent and respected citizen, who has a considerable reputation and
esteem of his family, friends and others to consider." 189 Thus, even if the
innocent person appears to be nervous or upset, officers should not take these
emotions to indicate guilt.190
Research suggests that fearful people often choose to remain silent.
Communications researchers have found that members of organizations often
fail to report problems to management or engage in whistle-blowing activity out
of fear that there might be negative consequences for speaking up. 191 These
individuals likely worry that their actions might result in isolation or the loss of
a job. A potential arrestee may have similar worries that dissuade her from
reporting alleged crimes to law enforcement. She may fear that a report will
result in isolation or physical harm if she implicates someone else or the loss of

184 Gudjonsson, supra note 177, at 25.
185 Id.

186 Id. at 26.
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freedom if she unknowingly implicates herself. These fears may be potent
enough to convince the potential arrestee that she should remain silent.
F. "I'm Silent Because I Don'tKnow What to Say."
Finally, arrestees may remain silent because they have no idea how to
respond to the questions posed to them. As one commentator notes, "When
individuals are unsure of how to respond to ambiguous comments or conduct
by others, they may remain silent to gauge the situation and determine whether
or not to respond or terminate discourse." 192 Individuals may not know how
they should react
to embarrassing or socially awkward situations and instead
193
silence.
choose
Cross-cultural differences may also explain why some arrestees remain
silent. Research demonstrates that silence carries different meanings in
different cultures.' 94 Additionally, children of different cultures learn different
norms regarding the use of silence which tell them when, where, and how they
should be silent. 9 5 The widely held belief in many countries is that a quiet
child is a well-behaved child. 196 Once these children become adults and find
themselves the subject of a police investigation, it is possible that their cultural
teachings about the use of silence may surface. Indeed, any language barrier
between the arrestee and the investigating officer might result in silence due to
the arrestee's inability to understand the investigator's language. 197 Again, the
use of silence in this context does not indicate the arrestee' s guilt.
V. LIMITING THE USE OF SILENCE
Conventional wisdom tells us that silence by an arrestee indicates guilt, or
at least a lack of credibility, and courts have admitted evidence of silence based
on this premise. Yet the interdisciplinary research cited above demonstrates

192 Krieger,

supra note 133, at 231.

193 Id.
'94 Sibel Tatar, Why Keep Silent? The ClassroomParticipationExperiences ofNon-Native-

English-Speaking Students, 5 LANGUAGE & INTERCULTURAL COMM. 284, 286 (2005).
195 Id.
196 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
197 See United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 846 (8th Cit. 2005) (Lay, J.,
concurring) ("The fact that [defendant] did not speak English only added to the ambiguity [of
his silence]. Even if he understood the arresting officer, he may have stood mute because he
lacked sufficient ability to articulate a protest of his innocence in English. Under these facts, it
is rank speculation to conclude that his silence demonstrated guilt.").
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that the premise is faulty. It is time that the courts reconfigure what silence
really means. At best, the social science research establishes that silence is
"insolubly ambiguous"' 198 whenever law enforcement is on the receiving end of
the silence. Before formulating a new solution to this inappropriate use of
silence, one must explore existing evidentiary tools and determine whether they
will solve the problem.
A. FederalRule of Evidence 403
Rule 403 permits exclusion of relevant evidence under certain
circumstances. The rule provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." 199 Rule 403 authorizes judges to balance the probative
value of the evidence against the likelihood that the evidence will unfairly harm
a party, confuse the jury, or waste the court's time. Rule 403 balancing
involves assessing the probative value of a piece of evidence against the risk of
unfair prejudice to a party. The Advisory Committee Notes following Rule 403
define unfair prejudice as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. ' 2°
On at least two occasions, the Supreme Court has found that the probative
value of an arrestee' s silence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice associated with such evidence. In Hale,0 l the Court found that while
the defendant's silence at the time of his arrest was not very helpful in
determining his credibility as a witness, it was highly prejudicial to the
defendant. 20 2 The Court explained:
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the
defendant's previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the defendant
to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the strong

198
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,617 (1976); see also supra Part IV.

R. EviD. 403.
FED.R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note; see also Old Chief v. United States, 519
U.S. 172, 180 (1997) ("The term 'unfair prejudice,' as to a criminal defendant, speaks to the
capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a
'99
FED.

200
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negative inference that the jury is likely to draw20 3from the fact that the
defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest.
Likewise, in Grunewald,2°4 the Court found that the defendant's invocation
of his self-incrimination privilege during grand jury proceedings should not
have been admitted to impeach his credibility at trial.2 5 In assessing the
evidence of the defendant's silence, the Court determined that there was a great
risk of unfair prejudice associated with the silence.2 0 6 The Court noted that
"'[t]oo many, even those who should be better advised, view this privilege as a
shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke
it are
207
either guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege.' ,
In both Hale and Grunewald, the ambiguity of the defendant's silence,
when balanced against the high risk of unfair prejudice, called for exclusion of
the evidence. The social science research cited above demonstrates that an
arrestee's silence is ambiguous and not as probative as some courts would
hold. 208 In fact, the exclusion of this kind of evidence does not require an indepth analysis by courts. In almost every instance, a defendant's silence in the
face of law enforcement lacks probative value and carries with it an unfair
degree of prejudice. Therefore, this Article proposes a new rule of evidence
that will exclude such evidence without the need for case-by-case analyses by
the courts.
B. The Proposal- A New FederalRule of Evidence
1. The Precedent- Article IV of the FederalRules of Evidence
It is not unprecedented for a rule of evidence to declare that certain
evidence will always violate Rule 403's balancing test when offered for a
particular purpose. According to the Advisory Committee Notes following
Rule 403, several provisions contained in Article IV of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, including Rules 404,209 407,210 408,211 and 410,212 are concrete
203 Id.
204
205
20

at 180.
353 U.S. 391 (1957).
Id. at 424.

6id.

207 Id. at

421 (quoting Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956)).
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EvID.404(a).
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applications of Rule 403. Each of these rules concerns a situation where the
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or redundancy resulting from a piece
of evidence substantially outweighs any probative value associated with the
evidence. 3 For example, Rule 408 generally excludes evidence of offers to
compromise and statements made during settlement talks because such
evidence is irrelevant. 214 Such evidence has no tendency to make a defendant's
liability more or less probable, because the offer could be "motivated by a
desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position. 2t 5
Although evidence of an offer to settle lacks probative value, jurors might place
too much weight on such an offer, and unfair prejudice would result to the party
making the offer. It is important to note that Rule 408's exclusion also
reinforces a public policy interest in promoting the settlement of cases before
trial.21 6 If courts generally allowed settlement offers into evidence, parties
would be less likely to enter into settlement talks or make offers to compromise.
The drafters of the Federal Rules wanted to avoid admitting evidence that
might
27
settlement.
considering
without
trial
to
proceed
to
encourage parties
Similarly, Rule 407 is a concrete application of Rule 403's balancing test.
Rule 407 bars evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove
culpability.2 1 The rule bars such evidence because a defendant's corrective
21 9
action following an accident is not necessarily probative of her liability.
However, jurors might place great weight on a defendant's decision to take
corrective action, thereby creating unfair prejudice to the defendant.220 The
drafters of the Federal Rules also barred evidence of subsequent remedial
measures in order to "encourage[e] people to take, or at least not discourag[e]

210 Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures when offered to prove

negligence or culpability. FED. R. Evm. 407.
211 Rule 408 generally excludes evidence of offers to compromise or statements made
during compromise negotiations when offered to prove liability or to impeach through a prior
inconsistent statement. FED. R. EvID. 408(a).
212 Rule 410 generally excludes evidence of a defendant's withdrawn plea of guilt or no
contest or any statement made during plea negotiations. FED. R. EviD. 410.
213 FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee's note.
214 See FED. R. EviD. 408 advisory committee's note.
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them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.",221 Each of the above
rules, in addition to other rules found in the Federal Rules of Evidence, have
laid the groundwork for a new rule that would exclude evidence of a
defendant's silence not only because it lacks probative value, but also because
its exclusion would promote a strong social policy of not discouraging
defendants from asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.
2. New Rule BarringEvidence of Silence
As indicated earlier, although it is clear that evidence of a criminal
defendant's silence in the face of law enforcement will almost always violate
Rule 403's balancing test, courts may decide to admit such evidence based on
their own belief that silence is probative of the defendant's guilt or credibility.
A federal rule excluding evidence of silence would ensure the fair treatment of
defendants regardless of their trial jurisdiction. The proposed rule states as
follows:
Inadmissibility of Evidence of Silence.
Evidence of a criminal defendant's pre-trial failure to communicate with law
enforcement is not admissible in a criminal proceeding on behalf of any party,
when offered to (1) prove the defendant's guilt for the crime charged; (2)
establish the defendant's adoption of an accusation by law enforcement under
Rule 801(d)(2)(B); or (3) impeach a testifying defendant through a prior
inconsistent statement or contradiction under Rule 613.
The new rule seeks to bar evidence of a defendant's failure to speak to law
enforcement officers. The rule does not bar the use of a defendant's silence in
the face of non-law enforcement because the mere thought of communicating
with police officers might trigger some of the reasons for silence highlighted in
an earlier section of this Article. 222 While an individual may be unafraid to
respond to questions or accusations by family members or friends, she might be
quite fearful of attempting to plead her innocence to law enforcement. It may
very well be natural for an individual to plead her innocence to those close to
her yet unnatural to proclaim innocence to police officers whom she feels she
cannot convince anyway.

221
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222
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Accordingly, the new rule excludes evidence when a defendant's pre-trial
silence is so ambiguous that its probative value in establishing the defendant's
guilt is questionable, there is proof of an adoptive admission by the defendant,
or the evidence is offered to prove the defendant's lack of credibility by way of
a prior inconsistent statement.223 Similar to the manner in which courts apply
the other Article IV rules, 2 4 if a party offers evidence of a defendant's silence
for a purpose other than those prohibited by the rule, the evidence would not
violate the rule. 2 5 This limitation on the prohibited purposes recognizes that
evidence of silence is almost universally used for one of the three purposes
listed in the rule. The limitation also provides the trial judge with some
discretion to admit the evidence if its proponent formulates a novel purpose for
it. Evidence admissible under the new rule, however, would still remain
subject to the Rule 403 balancing test. If the trial court finds that the evidence
lacks sufficient probative value and unfairly prejudices the defendant, it has the
power to exclude the evidence.226
Like the other rules in Article IV of the Federal Rules, the new rule
excludes evidence of silence not only because it lacks probative value, but also
because the exclusion promotes important public policy interests. The new rule
ensures that arrestees will not be improperly discouraged from asserting their
Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. It also recognizes that arrestees
may know of the existence of their privilege against self-incrimination even
before they receive Mirandawarnings and acknowledges that their decision to
remain silent may very well be an assertion of the privilege. 27 This protection
of an important social policy makes the new rule analogous to the other Article
IV rules that promote public policy interests. Indeed, consistent with the
Advisory Committee's recognition concerning other Article IV exclusions, the
public policy protection that the new rule provides in relation to the Fifth
Amendment privilege is a more impressive ground supporting the exclusion of

223See supra Part H.

224
See supra Part V.B.1.
225 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 ("This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another purpose.
); FED. R. EviD. 408(b) ("This rule
does not require the exclusion of the evidence if the evidence is offered for purposes not
prohibited
by subdivision (a).").
226
See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note ("Evidence of subsequent measures
that is not barred by Rule 407 may still be subject to exclusion on Rule 403 grounds when the
dangers
227 of prejudice or confusion substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.").
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.

2008-2009] THE LADY DOTH PROTEST TOO LITTLE

55

evidence of silence than is the finding that the evidence lacks probative
value.228
VI. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, rules of evidence should reflect what a culture knows about
human behavior. The Federal Rules of Evidence reflect collective wisdom
about what kinds of evidence are relevant and reliable, as well as what jurors
are likely to do with the evidence presented to them. The Rules also serve to
reinforce certain extrinsic public policy goals that often outweigh consideration
of the relevance or reliability associated with a piece of evidence. What is now
known about evidence of a defendant's silence is clear: A defendant might
choose to remain silent for various reasons, and most of those reasons have
nothing to do with the defendant's guilt, innocence, or lack of credibility.
These various reasons for silence make such evidence "insolubly ambiguous"
and of little value to the fact-finder. Researchers also know that jurors, and
often judges, find evidence of silence to be more probative than it actually is.
This kind of reasoning results in unfair prejudice to the defendant. Finally, of
the various reasons one might choose to remain silent, one reason, the existence
of the privilege against self-incrimination, deserves the greatest protection. The
new evidentiary rule this Article proposes recognizes the low probative value of
and unfair prejudice associated with a defendant's silence. The rule also
ensures that the government will place no improper burden upon a defendant's
Fifth Amendment privilege. In the end, the new rule is one step toward
achieving a more perfect body of evidentiary laws.
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